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CHAPTER12 
Constitutional Law 
STEPHENJ.CALLAHAN* 
§ 12.1. First Amendment Immunity from Liability- Free Exercise of 
Religion. Two lines of cases have emerged regarding the first amendment 
immunity for religious conduct. In cases involving disputes between 
adverse factions within a hierarchical church, the United States Supreme 
Court has held that the first amendment requires civil courts to defer to 
the decisions of the church hierarchy in matters offaith, doctrine, internal 
organization and discipline. 1 Such matters, the court has reasoned, are 
essentially ecclesiastical and inappropriate for judicial resolution.2 In a 
separate line of cases involving claims of conscientious religious objection 
to state regulation, the Court has interpreted the free exercise clause to 
require a balancing of the competing interests of the state and the be-
liever. 3 Declaring that state regulation which burdens the exercise of 
religious belief must be necessary to the achievements of a compelling 
state interest, the Court has set the balance in favor of the religious 
claimant.4 
During the Survey year, in Alberts v. Devine, the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that a patient has a cause of action in tort against any person 
who violates or causes to be violated the duty of confidentiality owed to 
*STEPHEN J. CALLAHAN is an Associate Professor at Suffolk University Law 
School. The author thanks Judith Perritano for her research assistance. 
§ 12.1. 1 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (court may not resolve church property 
dispute on basis of religious doctrine but may apply neutral principles of law); Serbian 
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (court must defer to decision of 
hierarchy of Serbian Orthodox Church defrocking local bishop); Presbyterian Church v. 
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hall Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (property 
dispute between local church factions must be resolved "without reference to underlying 
controversies over religious doctrine"). 
2 See Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449 (court resolution of ecclesiastical controver-
sies may inhibit free development of religious doctrine). 
3 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972) ("sensitive and delicate task of 
weighing" state interest against claim of religious exemption from compulsory education 
requirements). 
4 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (l%3) (compelling interest required to 
outweigh burden on free exercise of religion). See also Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana 
Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) ("the state may justify an inroad on religious 
liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state 
interest"). 
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the patient by a physician. 5 Because the patient in Alberts was a Meth-
odist minister whose psychiatrist allegedly disclosed confidences to the 
minister's superiors, the Court was confronted with a claim of first 
amendment immunity. The Court rejected an argument that the inquiry 
by church officials was an ecclesiastical matter and applied the balancing 
test developed in the conscientious objection cases.6 The Court con-
cluded that the public interest in physician-patient confidentiality out-
weighed the burden on the exercise of religion occasioned by judicial 
scrutiny of the actions of church officials or the imposition of liability 
upon them. 7 
Until1974, William E. Alberts was the minister ofthe Old West Church 
in Boston and a member of the Southern New England Conference of 
the United Methodist Church.8 At some point during his tenure, Alberts 
sought treatment from a psychiatrist, Dr. Donald T. Devine.9 In 1973 
during an investigation of Alberts' fitness as a minister, two of Alberts' 
superiors in the Southern New England Conference, Edward G. Carroll 
and John E. Barclay, allegedly obtained confidential information from 
Dr. Devine and communicated that information to other officials in the 
conference. 10 Alberts was not reappointed to his position at the Old West 
Church. 11 He later filed suit against his psychiatrist and his religious 
superiors for the violation of the duty of confidentiality. 12 · 
Carroll and Barclay filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment 
asserting that their investigation and report of Alberts' fitness were in-
ternal church matters protected by the first amendment. 13 They also filed 
a motion for protective order to limit discovery and disclosure of actions 
they took as representatives of the Methodist Church. 14 The trial judge 
5 395 Mass. 59, 479 N.E.2d 113 (1985). The Court qualified its holding to the extent that 
the duty of confidentiality is not violated if the patient consents or if there exists a serious 
danger to the patient or others. /d. at 75, 479 N.E.2d at 124. To establish liability against 
one who induces the violation of confidentiality, the plaintiff must show that the defendant 
knew of the physician-patient relationship, intended to induce the disclosures and did not 
reasonably believe that the doctor could disclose the information without violating the duty 
of confidentiality. /d. at 70-71, 479 N.E.2d at 121. 
6 See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 ("only those interests of the highest order and those 
not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion"). 
7 Alberts, 395 Mass. at 74, 479 N.E.2d at 123. 
• /d. at 61, 479 N.E.2d at 116. 
9 /d. 
10 /d. 
11 /d. at 61-62, 479 N.E.2d at 116. 
12 /d. 
13 /d. Alberts also moved to amend his complaint to add a count for invasion of privacy, 
which the court denied. 
14 /d. at 62-63, 479 N.E.2d at 116-17. 
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granted the motions and entered judgment for Carroll and Barclay. 15 She 
denied the psychiatrist's motion to dismiss. The court then reported four 
questions to the Appeals Court concerning the validity of the plaintiff's 
cause of action and the effect of the religion clauses of the first amend-
ment.16 The Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case to its own docket 
and considered the questions as applied to all of the defendants. 17 
On appeal, Carroll and Barclay argued that they were entitled to judg-
ment because a rule of the Book of Discipline of the Methodist Church 
required them to obtain information concerning the mental and emotional 
condition of a minister. 18 First, because they were following internal 
church rules regarding the selection of a minister, they argued that the 
church autonomy precedents precluded a court from inquiring into the 
dispute. 19 Secondly, because their investigation of Alberts was motivated 
by religious doctrine, they claimed that judicial inquiry or the imposition 
of liability would unduly burden their free exercise of religion. 20 
The Supreme Judicial Court conceded that the first amendment pro-
hibits judicial inquiry into internal church disputes of an ecclesiastical 
nature. 21 Thus the Court suggested that a civil court may not resolve a 
dispute about whether a person is qualified to be a minister. 22 However, 
the Court characterized the question in Alberts more narrowly as whether 
a church rule granted church officers the right to intrude upon the con-
"/d. at 63, 479 N.E.2d at 117. 
16 /d. See MAss. R. C1v. P. 64, 365 Mass. 931 (1974). The reported questions were: (I) 
Whether disclosure of confidential medical information by a psychiatrist of a former patient 
constitutes a cognizable cause of action within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; (2) 
Whether a cause of action for invasion of privacy existed within the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts prior to July 1, 1974; (3) Whether the actions of the defendants Barclay and 
Carroll are within the ambit of the privileges and immunites granted by the first and 
fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution; and (4) Whether the judge 
properly invoked the first amendment in entering the protective order for defendants 
Barclay and Carroll. The Supreme Judicial Court answered reported question number one 
"yes." Because the cause of action for violation of the duty of confidentiality permitted 
recovery, the Court did not answer reported question number two. 395 Mass. at 70, 479 
N.E.2d at 121. 
17 395 Mass. at 65, 479 N.E.2d at 118. Because the trial court had entered judgment for 
defendants Barclay and Carroll, the reporting mechanism did not technically apply to the 
plaintiff's claims against them, but only as to defendant Devine. Becaus.e all of the parties 
relied upon the reporting vehicle of review, the Court considered the question as applicable 
to the claims against all of the defendants. 
18 395 Mass. at 72, 479 N.E.2d at 122. 
19fd. 
20 /d. at 73, 479 N.E.2d at 123. 
21 /d. at 72, 479 N.E.2d at 122. 
22 /d. at 72-73, 479 N.E.2d at 122. 
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fidential relationship of a minister with his physician.23 That question was 
for the Court, open to judicial consideration.24 
Even assuming that the first amendment prohibits inquiry into whether 
there existed a valid church rule giving Carroll and Barclay a right to 
seek information from the psychiatrist, the Court stated that such a rule 
would not provide absolute protection against tort liability. 25 Conduct 
motivated by religious belief, the Court noted, is subject to regulation if 
the state's interest is sufficiently compelling to outweigh the burden on 
the exercise of religion. 26 The Court found that imposing liability upon 
church officials who were following church doctrine would constitute a 
burden on the exercise of religious belief. 27 Thus it applied the balancing 
test focusing upon two factors. First, the Court emphasized the strong 
public interest in promoting full, frank and candid discussion within the 
physician-patient relationship.28 Second, though recognizing that the 
church has a significant interest in evaluating the fitness of its ministers, 
the Court pointed out that sources of information other than the psychi-
atrist were available. 29 Because the state's interest was compelling and 
the burden on religious belief minor, the Court concluded that neither 
the imposition of liability, nor the necessary judicial inquiry into church 
processes violated the free exercise clause.3° For the same reasons, the . 
Court held that the trial court was wrong to limit discovery into church 
proceedings. 31 
Finally, the Court considered whether the discovery process into in-
ternal church matters would violate the establishment clause. 32 Although 
administrative entanglement between government and church raises es-
tablishment clause concerns, the Court held that the limited intrusion of 
23 /d. at 73, 479 N.E.2d at 122. 
24 /d. In Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (1985), the Court held that 
the decision of the Christian Science Monitor to fire a reporter because she was a homo-
sexual was an ecclesiastical matter requiring the Court to defer to the church. 395 Mass. 
at 722-23, 481 N.E.2d at 1165. In Madsen, Justice O'Connor disagreed that the decision 
was a religious one immune from judicial scrutiny. 395 Mass. at 732, 481 N.E.2d at 1170 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
25 Alberts, 395 Mass. at 73, 479 N.E.2d at 122. 
26 /d. at 74, 479 N.E.2d at 123. 
27 /d. 
28 /d. In the first part of the opinion the Alberts Court held that there exists a common 
law tort cause of action for the violation of the physician's duty of confidentiality because 
of the strong public policy in favor of confidentiality. 395 at 65-69, 479 N.E.2d at 118-20. 
29 Alberts, 395 Mass. at 74, 479 N.E.2d at 123. 
30 /d. 
31 /d. 
32 Id. at 75, 479 N.E.2d at 123. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 
(l971)(establishing three-part test in establishment clause cases in part proscribing "exces-
sive government entanglement with religion"). 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1985 [1985], Art. 16
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1985/iss1/16
§ 12.2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 353 
discovery in a tort action is not the kind of ongoing surveillance of the 
church condemned as excessive under the establishment clause.33 
The Supreme Judicial Court was correct to reject the claim of first 
amendment immunity in Alberts, but its application of the balancing test 
under the free exercise clause appears to be somewhat inconsistent with 
recent United States Supreme Court decisions. In Thomas v. Review 
Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, the Supreme Court 
held that not only must the state's interest be compelling, but also that 
the state regulation must be the least restrictive means of accomplishing 
that interest. 34 This strict means scrutiny requires the court to examine 
whether the state's interest can be achieved while recognizing an exemp-
tion for the religiously-motivated conduct. 35 Two factors support the 
Alberts Court's conclusion that an exemption was unwarranted. First, 
the means by which a minister's superiors investigated his fitness impli-
cates the church's interest in autonomy rather than the individual exercise 
of religious conscience. Secondly, the rule of tort liability established in 
Alberts does not significantly intrude on the church's freedom to select 
its ministers. Because the church's interest is institutional and the burden 
minor, the refusal by the Alberts Court to recognize an exemption for 
church officials was appropriate. 
§ 12.2. First Amendment Immunity - Deference to Internal Church 
Decisions. In a series of decisions involving disputes between adverse 
factions of a hierarchical church, the United States Supreme Court has 
held that the first amendment requires civil courts to defer to decisions 
of the church hierarchy in matters offaith, doctrine, internal organization 
and discipline. 1 The Supreme Court has not applied this principle of 
33 Alberts, 395 Mass. at 75, 479 N.E.2d at 123. 
34 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). See generally, Seeburger, "Public Policy Against Religion: 
Doubting Thomas," 11 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 311 (characterizing least restrictive alternative 
test of Thomas as too strict in that it fails to allow for weighing relative importance of 
burdened religious activity). But see Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 
1984)(impact of statute is factor to be used in applying compelling interest test). 
35 See U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982)(final inquiry in free exercise analysis is 
whether accommodating the religious belief will unduly interfere with achievement of 
government's interest). 
§ 12.2. 1 See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (court may not resolve church property 
dispute on basis of religious doctrine but may apply neutral principles of law); Serbian 
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (court must defer to decision of 
hierarchy of Serbian Orthodox Church defrocking local bishop); Presbyterian Church v. 
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hall Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,449 (1969) (property 
dispute between local church factions must be resolved "without reference to underlying 
controversies over religious doctrine"); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 
(1960) (canon law right of North American archbishop of Russian Orthodox Church to use 
of cathedral in New York City is ecclesiastical matter subject to strict deference by court). 
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absolute deference to a case involving government regulation of employ-
ment relations in church organizations. 2 Lower courts considering the 
application of the deference principle in employment cases have limited 
it to disputes involving ministers or employees in important ecclesiastical 
positions. 3 In the two cases involving church employees fired because of 
their sexual preference, the courts held that church officials were immune 
from liability under the free exercise clause, but they relied upon a 
balancing approach rather than the deference principle. 4 
During the Survey year, in Madsen v. Erwin,5 the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that the decision by the Christian Science Monitor to fire a 
reporter because she was a homosexual was entitled to absolute first 
amendment protection.6 In reaching its decision, the Court relied upon a 
broad principle of deference to internal church decisions rather that the 
free exercise clause balancing test which it had applied in Alberts v. 
Devine.7 
Cf. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871) (as matter of federal common law civil 
court may not review Presbyterian Church decision as to which local church faction 
represented true church). 
2 Cf. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian School,_ U.S._, 106 S. Ct. 2718, 
91 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1986) (requiring court to abstain pending state administrative proceedings 
involving claim of employment discrimination by religious school); NLRB v. Catholic 
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (avoiding religion clause issue by deciding on 
statutory grounds that Catholic high schools were not subject to jurisdiction of National 
Labor Relations Board). 
3 See Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th 
Cir. 1985) (church interest in autonomy in decision to deny to woman a pastoral position 
outweighed state interest in equal opportunity under Title VII); E.E.O.C. v. Pacific Press 
Pub. Ass'n., 676 F.2d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982) (application of Title VII to editorial 
secretary of religiously-affiliated publisher does not violate first amendment); E.E.O.C. v. 
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 286 (5th Cir. 1981) (application 
of Title VII to seminary faculty and support staff not engaged in traditionally religious 
activities does not violate free exercise clause) cert. denied 456 U.S. 905 (1982); E.E.O.C. 
v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 489 (5th Cir. 1980) (application of Title VII to position 
of professor in psychology department at Baptist college does not violate first amendment). 
But see Maguire v. Marquette Univ., 627 F. Supp. 1499, (E.D. Wis. 1986) (interpreting 
Title VII to exempt religious university as to hiring for position of theology professor); 
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972) (Title VII interpreted to 
exempt employment relationship between Salvation Army church and its officers who are 
ministers). 
4 Walker v. First Presbyterian Church, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 762 (Calif. Super. Ct. 
1980) (ordinance proscribing sexual preference discrimination does not outweigh free ex-
ercise burden upon religion in case of discharge of member of church's worship team) 
Lewis ex rei. Murphy v. Buchanan, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 696 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1979) 
(refusal of church to hire gay music teacher at parochial school protected by free exercise 
clause). 
5 395 Mass. 715, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (1985). 
6 /d. at 723, 481 N.E.2d at 1165. 
7 395 Mass. 59, 73, 479 N.E.2d 113, 123 (1985). In Alberts, the Court held that imposing 
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The Christian Science Monitor is an international daily newspaper 
affiliated with the First Church of Christ Scientist. 8 The church has a 
policy of hiring only church members as employees in all of its activities.9 
Christine Madsen had worked for several years as an ed~tor and reporter 
for the Monitor until 1981 when rumors that she was a lesbian came to 
the attention of her superiors. 10 When she admitted to them that she was 
a lesbian and refused to seek spiritual healing, Ms. Madsen was fired. 11 
She filed suit in superior court against officials of the newspaper and the 
church alleging that the decision to fire her for being a homosexual was 
a breach of her employment contract and constituted illegal discrimina-
tion under state and federal law. 12 The defendants moved for summary 
judgment asserting that their actions were privileged under the religion 
clauses of the first amendment. 13 The trial court denied the motion and 
the defendants sought an interlocutory appea!Y The Supreme Judicial 
Court transferred the case to its own motion. 
The Court began its analysis of the religious freedom issue by exam-
ining the nature of the decision to fire Madsen. 15 Based upon the summary 
judgment evidence, the Court concluded that the operation of the Monitor 
was a religious activity of the Christian Science Church and thus consid-
ered employees of the newspaper to be employees of the church. 16 Be-
cause homosexuality is a sin under Christian Science doctrine, the de-
cision to fire Madsen, the Court reasoned, was a religious one. 17 Thus, 
liability upon a Methodist minister's superiors for violating his confidential relationship 
with his psychiatrist did not violate the first amendment. See § 12.1 of this chapter. 
8 Madsen, 395 Mass. at 720, 481 N.E.2d at 1163. 
9[d. 
1o Id. at 718,481 N.E.2d at 1162. 
"ld. 
12 /d. at 716-17, 481 N.E.2d at 1161. The plaintiff alleged several causes of action arising 
out of the decision to fire her for homosexuality including wrongful discharge, breach of 
contract, violation of the state and federal constitutions, and deprivation of civil rights 
under M.G.L. c.122 §§ llH and Ill. The Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment 
as to these claims. Madsen also asserted tort claims of defamation, interference with 
advantageous relations, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
interference with her employment contract. Because these claims sounded in tort the Court 
directed that she be allowed to replead those claims consistent with the principles set out 
in its opinion. 395 Mass. at 727, 481 N.E.2d at 1167. 
13 Madsen, 395 Mass. at 717, 481 N.E.2d at 1161. The defendants moved to dismiss the 
plaintiff's claims and in the alternative for summary judgment. They argued on appeal that 
the litigation threatened their rights under the free exercise clause and the establishment 
clause. ld. at 718, 481 N.E.2d at 1162. 
14 See Appeals Court Rules No. 2:01, 3 Mass. App. 805 (1975) (practice before single 
justice of Appeals Court). 
"Madsen, 395 Mass. at 719-22, 481 N.E.2d at 1163-64. 
16 /d. at 723, 481 N.E.2d at 1164. 
17 ld. at 722-23, 481 N.E.2d at 1164. 
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the Court characterized the decision as an internal ecclesiastical matter 
requiring the Court to defer to the decision of the church hierarchy. 18 
Grounding its decision in the free exercise clause, the Court indicated 
that judicial intervention into the decision to fire a homosexual employee 
would undermine religious freedom in two ways. First, drawing upon the 
precedents upholding such firings, the Court emphasized that imposing 
liability upon church officials for discriminating on the basis of sexual 
preference would penalize them for their exercise of religious belief. 19 
Secondly, because the church employees carry out the religious mission 
of the church, government regulations of the employment relationship 
would deprive the church of the undivided loyalty owed by its employees 
and undermine the freedom of the church as a religious institution. 20 
Therefore, the Court held that none of the plaintiff's claims based upon 
an alleged right against sexual preference discrimination could be applied 
to the church or its agents. 21 
Only after deciding the constitutional issue did the Court consider 
whether state or federal law gave rise to a cause of action for sexual 
preference discrimination. Finding no support for Ms. Madsen's claims 
under the state or federal constitution or statutes or the principles of 
contract law, the Court held that summary judgment was proper. 22 
Dissenting in part, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority for reaching 
out to decide the constitutional issue in view of the fact that the plaintiff 
18 Id. The Court relied upon Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, supra note I, and United 
Kosher Butchers Ass'n v. Associated Synagogues of Greater Boston, Inc., 349 Mass. 595, 
598-99, 211 N.E.2d 332, 334 (1965). In United Kosher, the Court held that a dispute between 
two associations over the right to certify whether food was kosher was an ecclesiastical 
matter immune from judicial scrutiny. 349 Mass. at 598, 211 N.E.2d at 334. But cf. Gray 
v. Christian Soc., 137 Mass. 329, 331 (1884) (deprivation of membership in a church without 
a hearing properly resolved by court). 
19 Madsen, 395 Mass. at 723, 481 N.E.2d 1165. 
20 ld. The Court quoted extensively from Laycock, "Towards a General Theory of the 
Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy," 
81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373 (1979). Professor Laycock argues that the free exercise clause 
protects not only individual freedom of religious belief but also the autonomy of religious 
organizations and proposes a balancing test be used in cases involving regulation of the 
church-employee relationship. But see Lupu, "Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and 
Speech in the U.S. Constitution," 18 CoNN. L. REv. 739, 765-67 (1986) (rejecting institu-
tional claims to free exercise exemptions). 
21 Madsen, 395 Mass. at 724, 481 N.E.2d at 1166. The Court distinguished Tony and 
Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) in which the Supreme 
Court held that application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to the commercial activities of 
a religious organization did not violate the free exercise clause, finding no burden upon the 
exercise of religion. 471 U.S. at 303. The Court in Alamo Foundation used the free exercise 
balancing approach rather than principles of church autonomy to resolve the issue. 
22 Madsen, 395 Mass. at 725-26, 481 N.E.2d at 1166. 
8
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had stated no claim arising under state or federallaw. 23 He also disagreed 
with the majority's resolution of the first amendment issue, reasoning 
that the question whether the church had a right to fire a homosexual 
employee for violating church doctrine was not an internal ecclesiastical 
dispute calling for absolute deference. 24 Rather, Justice O'Connor viewed 
it as an issue appropriate for judicial resolution to be determined by a 
balancing of the interests of church and state.25 
The result in Madsen is not controversial. As Justice O'Connor in-
sisted, Madsen had no right under state or federal law to be free from 
sexual preference discrimination. But the Court's insistence upon strict 
deference to the church's decision to fire Madsen stretches the principle 
of church autonomy beyond the precedents and the logic underlying 
them. The church autonomy cases have established a principle of judicial 
deference to internal ecclesiastical decisions. 26 But the crucial factor in 
deciding whether the question is ecclesiastical is the nature of the un-
derlying dispute and not the motivation of church officialsY A civil court 
may not decide what is the true doctrine of a church, nor which local 
faction more truly represents church principles. 28 Such decisions neces-
sarily involve how a church defines and organizes itself and are thus 
"quintessentially religious" issues.29 For the same reason, a court must 
defer to the church's choice of its ministers. 30 But the concern for reli-
gious freedom underlying the church autonomy cases does not have the 
same force when applied to decisions involving lay employees. This is 
especially true when the employee's duties are entirely secular. Although 
Madsen worked for the Christian Science Church in the sense that the 
Monitor is affiliated with the church, she was not involved in the church's 
23 Id. at 727-28, 481 N.E.2d at 1167-68. (O'Connor J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part.) Justice O'Connor dissented from that part of the Court's decision allowing the plaintiff 
to replead her tort claims. Justice O'Connor would have affirmed the dismissal of these 
claims as well as the entry of summary judgment. Id. at 736, 481 N.E.2d at 1172. 
24 Madsen, 395 Mass. at 732, 481 N.E.2d at 1170. 
25 Id. at 733, 481 N.E.2d at 1170-71. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 
(1972) (state's interest in compulsory education beyond eighth grade did not outweigh free 
exercise rights of Amish parents to keep children free of corrupting influences). See also 
Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 479 N.E.2d 113 (1985), supra at note 7. 
26 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
27 See Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th 
Cir. 1985) (" ... in quintessentially religious matters the free exercise clause protects the 
act of decision rather than the motivation behind it."). 
28 Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hall Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 
u.s. 440 (1%9). 
29 See Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 720 (1976). 
30 See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, as untimely 
filed, 409 U.S. 896 (1972) (emphasizing deference to church's autonomy in interpreting Title 
VII to exempt church-minister relationship). 
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ecclesiastical mission. Because the decision to fire a homosexual em-
ployee does not implicate the values underlying the principle of church 
autonomy, it is not entitled to absolute deference. 
The fact that Madsen's superiors were motivated by their belief that 
homosexuality is a sin does not provide a sufficient reason to apply a 
principle of absolute deference. The Court was not called upon to decide 
whether homosexuality violated Christian Science doctrine. At best such 
religiously motivated conduct should be weighed against the competing 
state interests under the balancing test employed in Alberts v. Devine. 31 
Although the Madsen Court appeared to establish a broad rule of 
deference to church organizations to determine the spiritual suitability of 
its employees, the structures of its opinion may support a narrower 
interpretation. 32 After setting out the autonomy principle requiring judi-
cial deference, the Court measured the potential burden of imposing 
liability upon church officials for exercising their religious belief. Finally, 
the Court examined whether the plaintiff had stated a cause of action 
arising out of state or federal law. Because there was no articulated 
governmental interest in protecting against sexual preference discrimi-
nation, the Court was correct to enter judgment for the defendant. 
Viewed as a balancing of the interests under the free exercise clause, the 
opinion in Madsen is consistent with Alberts v. Devine and the principles 
underlying the free exercise clause. 
§ 12.3. Right to Travel. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment has been held to protect against classifications which burden 
the right to travel from one state to another to establish residence. 1 
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Supreme Judicial Court 
has decided whether there is a parallel right to migrate within a state. 2 
During the Survey year, however, the Supreme Judicial Court considered 
whether an asserted right to intrastate travel was violated by a statute 
providing a real estate tax abatement only to those elderly homeowners 
31 395 Mass. 59, 479 N.E.2d 113 (1985). 
32 Two commentators have interpreted Madsen as a conscientious objection case. Lay-
cock, "A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States," 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 433 
n.142 (1986); Note, "Equal Employment or Excessive Entanglement? The Application of 
Employment Discrimination Statutes to Religiously Affiliated Organizations," 18 CONN. L. 
REV. 581, 603-04 (1986). 
§ 12.3. 'See, e.g., Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, _U.S. _, 106 
S. Ct. 2317, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986) and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
2 See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974). See also 
Milton v. Civil Service Commission, 365 Mass. 368, 371 n.2, 312 N.E.2d 188, 191 n.2 (1974) 
(assuming "arguendo" that right to intrastate travel is protected right). 
10
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who had owned and occupied the same residence for at least ten years. 3 
In Lee v. Commissioner of Revenue, the Court held that, if a right to 
intrastate travel existed, the statute's ten-year occupancy requirement 
did not penalize the exercise of that right and was a rational means of 
promoting legitimate state interests.4 
During the 1970's real estate values in Massachusetts increased dra-
matically causing higher property assessments and increased taxes. 5 In 
1981, the Massachusetts legislature enacted a statute allowing local com-
munities to grant a tax abatement to certain classes of homeowners, 
including persons with limited assets over seventy years of age who had 
owned and occupied the same residence for ten years. 6 John and Cath-
erine Lee had owned their home in Springfield from 1943 to 1977, when 
they sold it to their son and purchased a smaller home in the same city. 7 
In 1982, the Lees applied for a real estate tax abatement pursuant to the 
statute, but it was denied solely because they did not satisfy the ten-
year occupancy requirement. 8 
The Lees filed a class action9 in superior court alleging that the occu-
pancy requirement violated their right to travel under the federal consti-
tution. 10 The trial judge found that the denial of the tax abatement would 
have a significant impact on the Lee's ability to obtain the necessities of 
life and subjected the statute's occupancy requirement to strict judicial 
scrutiny. 11 Because the court determined that there was no compelling 
3 Lee v. Commissioner of Revenue, 395 Mass. 527, 481 N.E.2d 183 (1985). 
4 ld. 
5 Id. at 532, 481 N.E.2d at 187. 
6 G.L. c.59, seventeenth C. The statute allows cities and towns to accept the tax abate-
ment and provides in pertinent part: 
Seventeenth C Real Estate, to the taxable valuation of two thousand dollars or the 
sum of one hundred and seventy-five dollars, whichever would result in an abatement 
of the greater amount of actual taxes due, ... or a person or persons over the age 
of seventy who has owned and occupied it as a domicile for not less than ten years; 
provided that the whole estate, real and personal, of such ... person ... does not 
exceed in value the sum of forty thousand dollars ... exclusive of the first sixty 
thousand dollars in value of real estate occupied by such person as his domicile. 
G.L. c.59, § 5, seventeenth C. 
7 385 Mass. at 528, 481 N.E.2d at 185. 
8 Id. at 529, 481 N.E.2d at 185. 
9 Id. at 528, 481 N.E. 2d at 184 
10 The plaintiffs argued on appeal that the statute also violated the Massachusetts con-
stitution but did not discuss the state constitutional principles separately and the Supreme 
Judicial Court did not consider the state constitutional claim. See MASS. R. APP. PRo. 16(a) 
(4) (Appellate Court need not consider arguments not made in brief). See also Atterberry 
v. Police Commissioner of Boston, 392 Mass. 550, 555, 417 N.E.2d 150, 153 (1984) (refusing 
to consider state right to travel argument referred to only once in appellant brief). 
11 395 Mass. at 529, 481 N.E.2d at 185. 
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interest to support the requirement, it declared the ten-year requirement 
unconstitutional. 12 The Commissioner of Revenue appealed, and the Su-
preme Judicial Court transferred the case on its own motion. 13 
The plaintiffs in Lee asserted a right to intrastate travel and the Su-
preme Judicial Court assumed "for the purposes of discussion" that the 
federal constitution protects such a right. 14 Noting that the right to travel 
has most often been considered as an aspect of equal protection, the 
Court applied an equal protection analysis.IS 
The United States Supreme Court has held that durational residency 
requirements which penalize the exercise of the right to interstate travel 
must satisfy strict scrutiny. 16 When the state temporarily deprives a new 
resident of a basic benefit accorded other citizens, the residency require-
ment must be necessary to the achievement of a compelling interest. 17 
Nondurational residency requirements which deny equal benefits to 
newer residents based upon their date of arrival have also been con-
demned because they tend to create permanent fixed classes of citizens. 18 
l2Jd. 
13 /d. at 528, 481 N.E.2d at 185. 
14 395 Mass. at 527, 481 N.E.2d at 185. 
•s /d. The Court noted that if the right to travel derives from the privilege and immunities 
clause of article IV, the right to intrastate travel would not exist. Id. at n.6. See Zobel v. 
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 71-81 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
16 See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 257 (1974) (applying strict 
scrutiny to one-year county residence requirement for receipt of free non-emergency 
medical care at county hospital); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (one-year state 
residency requirement to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (one-year 
state residency requirement for receipt of welfare benefits). But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 
U.S. 343, 406-409 (no application of strict scrutiny to one-year residency requirement to 
file divorce petition). The denial of less important state benefits may not constitute a penalty 
on the exercise of the right to travel. Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238 (1970) 
aff'd mem. 401 U.S. 985 (1971) (denial of in-state tuition not a penalty on exercise of right 
to travel). 
17 Durational residency requirements have been distinguished from bona fide residence 
requirements. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321-33 (1983) (upholding Texas require-
ment of bona fide residence for receipt of tuition-free public education). Cf. Vlandis v. 
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 453 (permanent irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence of state 
university students who were nonresidents at time of application violates due process 
clause). 
18 See Attorney General of New York v. Soto--Lopez, _U.S._, 106 S. Ct. 2314, 2323, 
90 L. Ed. 2d 899, 908-09 (1986) (plurality opinion) (strict scrutiny applied to New York 
civil service veteran preference for New York residents at time of entry into service); See 
also Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 623, 105 S. Ct. 2862, 2869, 86 
L. Ed. 2d 487, 497 (striking down under rational basis standard statute limiting real estate 
exemption to Vietnam veterans residing in New Mexico prior to May, 1976) and Zobel v. 
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (striking down under rational basis standard Alaska 
dividend program providing differential benefit to state residents on basis of number of 
years of residence). Cf. Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 26, 105 S. Ct. 2465, 2474, 86 
12
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Because only those residency classifications which penalize the exer-
cise of the right to travel are subjected to strict scrutiny, the Court began 
its analysis by asking whether the denial of a tax abatement was so 
significant as to be deemed a penalty. 19 The Court reviewed the prece-
dents by focusing upon the nature of the deprivation. 20 The Court noted 
that statutes requiring new residents to wait one year to receive welfare 
benefits21 or free non-emergency medical care22 were held to have pen-
alized new residents for exercising their right to travel, but residency 
periods involving less serious deprivations such as lower tuition rates at 
state universities23 or lower mooring rates at public harbors24 were upheld 
under the deferential rational basis standard. The Court disagreed with 
the trial court's conclusion that the denial of the tax abatement had a 
significant impact upon the necessities of life and found no significant 
effect on the right to travel. 25 The Court emphasized that states are 
traditionally accorded broad discretion in developing and implementing 
taxing programs.26 Nor did the statute interfere with the right to interstate 
travelY Finally, the Court noted that the plaintiffs were not part of the 
class of persons subject to prejudice in the political process warranting 
increasedjudicial protection.28 Therefore, the Court applied the minimum 
rationality standard of review and held that the ten-year occupancy 
requirement was a rational means of furthering legitimate state interests.29 
In applying the rational basis standard, the Court emphasized that the 
L.Ed.2d II, 22 (striking down state program crediting automobile sales or use tax paid out 
of state but limiting credit to Vermont residents at time tax was paid). 
19 395 Mass. at 527, 481 N.E.2d at 185. See supra note 14. See also Milton v. Civil 
Service Commission, 365 Mass. 368, 372, 312 N.E.2d 188, 192 (1974) (one-year municipal 
residency requirement for application to police force not a penalty on exercise of right to 
travel). But see Fiorentino v. Probate Court, 365 Mass. 13, 19, 310 N.E.2d ll2, ll7 (1974) 
(two-year residency requirement to bring divorce action subjected to strict scrutiny as 
penalty on right to travel). 
20 Lee, 395 Mass. at 530-31, 481 N.E.2d at 186. 
21 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). 
22 Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 257 (1974). 
23 Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38, 41 (W.D. Wash.) aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1057 
(1973); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 
985 (1971). 
24 Hawaii Boating Association v. Water Transp. Facilities, 651 F.2d 661, 665 (9th Cir. 
1981). 
2
' 395 Mass. at 532, 481 N.E.2d at 187. 
26 /d. 
27 /d. Thus the Court suggests that the right to intrastate travel differs from the right to 
interstate migration. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,67 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
28 395 Mass. at 532, 481 N.E.2d at 187. The Court did not consider the plaintiffs to be 
part of a "discrete and insular minority" which might justify increased scrutiny. U.S. v. 
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
29 395 Mass. at 532, 481 N.E.2d at 187. 
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classes created by the statute were not similarly situated.30 Thus the 
legislature could have decided that elderly persons who sold their homes 
during a period of escalating values would have realized the increase in 
value, unlike those who decided to keep their homes. 31 Because the 
statute reflected relevant pre-existing differences between two groups of 
elderly homeowners, the Court held that it was not irrational.J2 Finally, 
the Court distinguished the occupancy requirement from fixed-date re-
sidency requirements which create permanent classes of citizens based 
upon the date of migration, because once the occupancy period has 
elapsed the homeowner will be entitled to equal enjoyment of the bene-
fit. 33 
In several respects the Lee case does not fit easily within the right to 
travel precedents. For instance, a ten-year occupancy requirement is 
quite unlike a waiting period of one year or less typically at issue in the 
durational residency cases. 34 However, the requirement does not per-
manently exclude the more recent migrant from the equal enjoyment of 
a state benefit as in the fixed-date residency cases. 35 Finally, Lee involves 
a claimed right of intrastate rather than interstate migration. 
The Supreme Judicial Court was careful not to explicitly recognize a 
right to intrastate migration. 36 The Supreme Court precedents suggest 
that the right to interstate migration derives from the structure of the 
federal constitution, the purpose of which was to forge one nation from 
a loose confederation of statesY Because the residency cases were de-
cided under the equal protection clause, they also may be seen as estab-
lishing a principle of equality of citizenship between newer and older 
residents of a state. 38 That principle is not implicated where the state 
30 /d. at 533, 481 N.E.2d at 187. 
31 /d. 
32 /d. 
33 395 Mass. at 534, 481 N .E.2d at 188. 
34 See supra note 16. 
35 See supra note 18. 
36 395 Mass. at 529, 481 N.E.2d at 185. In both Lee and Milton v. Civil Service Commis-
sion, 365 Mass. 368, 371 n.2, 312 N.E.2d 188, 191 n.2 (1974), the Court examined the 
burden imposed upon the asserted right to intrastate travel under the minimum equal 
protection standard and thus did not confront the issue directly. 
37 See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) (characterizing 
right to travel as synonymous with federal interest in free interstate migration). See also 
Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, _U.S. _, 106 S. Ct. 2317, 2323, 90 L. 
Ed. 2d 899, 909 (1986). 
38 See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 70 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("In short, as 
much as the right to travel, equality of citizenship is the essence of our Republic"). See 
generally, Cohen, "Equal Treatment for Newcomers: The Core of Meaning of National 
and State Citizenship," I CoNST. CoMMENTARY 9 (1984) (rejecting penalty rationale and 
arguing for principle of equality of citizenship applicable to all residency cases). 
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does not discriminate against interstate migrants. On the other hand, 
some courts have characterized the right to travel as a liberty interest in 
personal mobility and have concluded that there is a correlative funda-
mental right to intrastate travel. 39 When viewed as an aspect of personal 
liberty, the right to change one's residence should not be confined to 
interstate migration, but because there is less likelihood of discrimination 
against established residents than against new arrivals, the two rights 
may not be coextensive. Lee supports the argument that the federal 
constitution guarantees a right to intrastate migration, but the Supreme 
Judicial Court suggested that it may be constitutionally different than the 
right to interstate migration. 40 
Assuming the existence of a right to intrastate migration, the Lee Court 
treated the ten-year occupancy requirement as any other durational re-
sidency requirement. However, the length of the waiting period should 
be relevant to the issue of whether it penalizes the exercise of the right. 41 
Logically a ten-year requirement for a tax abatement may be more likely 
to discourage a change of residence than a one-year waiting period for 
a more significant benefit. This is especially true where the benefit is 
available only to elderly persons. In that sense, it is analogous to a 
permanent deprivation. The Lee Court did not consider the duration of 
the requirement, but simply concluded that the denial of the benefit by 
its nature did not significantly affect the right to travel.42 Nor did the 
Court analyze the significance of the benefit to the affected class. The 
denial of a tax abatement to elderly persons whose assets do not exceed 
$40,000 could be considered significant. 
In essence, the Lee Court held that the state could make it easier for 
certain elderly persons to keep their homes even if its program might 
indirectly inhibit others from moving. The Court relied upon the legisla-
tive assumption that those who sold their homes within the ten years 
39 See Bruno v. Civil Service Comm. of City of Bridgeport, 472 A.2d 328 (Conn. 1984) 
(right to intrastate travel violated by one-year residency requirement for eligibility for 
position of city recreation director). See also, King v. New Rochelle Mun. Housing Auth., 
442 F.2d 646, 648 (1971) ("It would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between 
states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative 
constitutional right to travel within a state"). But, cf., Philadelphia Lodge No.5 v. City of 
Philadelphia, 599 F. Supp. 254, 258 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (right to travel protects citizens traveling 
from state to state not a police officer on disability desiring to leave his residence and move 
about freely). 
40 395 Mass. at 532,481 N.E.2d at 187 (stating that statute "does not interfere with vitality 
of the principle of free interstate migration)" (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67 
(1982)). 
41 See Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, _U.S._, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 2324, 
90 L. Ed. 2d 899, 909 (permanent nature of deprivation relevant to issue of whether it 
penalizes exercise of right to travel). 
42 395 Mass. at 532, 481 N.E.2d at 187. 
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would have realized the increase in value. But the purchase of a new 
home in the same escalating housing market in a different neighborhood 
or a different city may well have required the spending of the profit. If 
there exists a right to free intrastate migration, the statute at issue in Lee 
unduly burdened that right. 
§ 12.4. Procedural Due Process. The due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment guarantees that a person will not be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without some adequate procedure to insure that the 
deprivation is warranted. 1 In most cases, due process requires a mean-
ingful opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation. 2 However, in 
cases where a pre-deprivation hearing is not possible or practicable, 
adequate post-deprivation procedures may satisfy the requirements of 
due process. 3 In Parratt v. Taylor, prison officials negligently deprived 
an inmate of a hobby kit he had sent for, and the inmate sued alleging 
that the failure to provide him with a pre-deprivation hearing violated 
the due process clause.4 The United States Supreme Court considered a 
pre-deprivation hearing to have been impossible because the acts of the 
prison officials were unauthorized and random.5 Because state law pro-
vided the inmate with an adequate remedy, the Court held that there had 
been no due process violation.6 The Supreme Court has extended the 
reasoning of Parratt in a case involving the intentional deprivation of 
property resulting from the random and unauthorized acts of state offi-
cials.7 The Supreme Court has not decided whether the Parratt rationale 
applies to deprivation of life or liberty, and the lower courts are in some 
disagreement. Some, relying on Justice Blackmon's concurring opinion 
in Parratt, have distinguished intrusions upon liberty from mere property 
§ 12.4. I u.s. CONST. AMEND. XIV. 
2 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, ("some kind of 
hearing" required prior to termination of public employee who has property interest in 
continued employment). See also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,437 (1982) 
(due process requires opportunity for hearing at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner). 
3 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977)(prior hearing for infliction of corporal 
punishment on junior high school students not required by due process clause where 
adequate post-deprivation remedy exists under state law). 
4 451 U.S. 527 (1981). In Parratt, the Supreme Court also stated that the negligent conduct 
of prison officials was a deprivation of the inmate's property interest. The Court overruled 
that part of Parratt in Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662, 663, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662, 666 
(1986). 
5 451 U.S. at 541. 
6 Id. at 544. 
7 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533-36 (random and unauthorized shakedown of 
prison inmates call does not violate due process where state remedies are adequate). 
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deprivations.8 Others, citing the Supreme Court's opinion in Ingraham 
v. Wright, 9 have applied the reasoning of Parratt focusing or whether the 
deprivation resulted from random unauthorized acts or established state 
procedures. 10 
During the Survey year, in Temple v. Marlborough Division of the 
District Court, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the failure of court 
officials to follow statutory procedures prior to the involuntary commit-
ment of the plaintiff did not violate the due process clause where an 
adequate post-commitment remedy was available under state law. 11 In so 
holding, the Court adopted the Parratt line of reasoning. 12 
In August, 1980, Richard Temple's father applied in the district court 
for a warrant of apprehension seeking to have his son committed for 
psychiatric care and protection. 13 Upon issuance of the warrant, the 
Marlborough police took Temple into custody and brought him to the 
Marlborough District Court, where he was interviewed by a court psy-
chiatrist.14 After the interview, the district court ordered that Temple be 
8 See, e.g., Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 826 (1st Cir. 1985) (Bownes, J., concurring) 
(arguing that !iff! and liberty are such that post-deprivation remedies are insufficient pro-
tection); Conway v. Village of Mt. Kisco, 758 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1985) (Parratt doctrine 
not applicable to liberty deprivation arising out of alleged malicious prosecution by local 
authorities); Wakinekona v. Olim, 664 F.2d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1981) (liberty deprivation in 
prison transfer). See also Note, "Defining the Parameters of Section 1983: Parratt v. 
Taylor," 23 B.C.L. REv. 1218 (1982) (arguing that Parratt should not apply to life or liberty 
deprivations). 
9 430 U.S. 651 (1977). See supra note 3. 
10 See, e.g., Burch v. Apalachee Community Health Services, 804 F.2d 1549, 1554-56 
(lith Cir. 1986) (Parratt applies to deprivation of liberty); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 
584 (6th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (same); Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 339 (5th Cir. 
1984) (same). See also Note, "Due Process Application of the Parratt Doctrine to Random 
and Unauthorized Deprivations of Life and Liberty," 52 FoRDHAM L. REV. 887 (1984). 
11 395 Mass. ll7, 479 N.E.2d 137 (1985). 
12 Id. at 126, 479 N.E.2d at 143. 
13 Id. at 120, 479 N.E.2d at 140. G.L. c.123, § l2(e) provides: 
Any person may make application to a district court justice for a ten-day commitment 
to a facility of a mentally ill person, whom the failure to confine would cause a 
likelihood of serious harm. After hearing such evidence as he may consider sufficient, 
a district court justice may issue a warrant for the apprehension and appearance 
before him of the allegedly mentally ill person, if in his judgment the condition or 
conduct of such person makes such action necessary or proper. Following appre-
hension, the court shall have the person examined by a physician designated to have 
the authority to admit to a facility in accordance with the regulations of the depart-
ment. If said physician reports that failure to hospitalize the person would create a 
likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental illness, the Court may order the 
person committed to a facility for a period not to exceed ten days, but the superin-
tendent may discharge him at any time within that ten day period. 
G.L. c.123, § 12(e). 
14 395 Mass. at 121, 479 N.E.2d at 140. 
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committed to a hospital for a period of ten days, after which he was 
released. 15 
In 1983, Temple filed suit in superior court under 42 U .S.C. section 
1983 16 against the district court judge, the court psychiatrist and several 
other state officials alleging that they had violated his rights under the 
fourth and fourteenth amendments. 17 He claimed in part that the psychi-
atrist and the judge had deprived him of his liberty without due process 
by failing to follow the requirements of the commitment statute. 18 Spe-
cifically, he alleged that he was not advised of his right to counsel, nor 
offered the opportunity to agree to a voluntary commitment. 19 The de-
fendants filed a motion to dismiss asserting in part that the court officials 
were immune from suit. 20 The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claims 
as to all defendants. 21 The plaintiff appealed and the Supreme Judicial 
Court transferred the case to its docket. 22 
The central issue on appeal was whether to apply the rationale of 
Parratt to a case involving the deprivation of a liberty interest. 23 Review-
ing the Parratt reasoning, the Temple Court stated that when state offi-
cials have failed to follow established procedures "the state action is not 
necessarily complete,"24 and state remedies for the deprivation of prop-
erty may be sufficient to satisfy due process. 25 The Court found no reason 
to apply a different rule when the state has deprived a person of a liberty 
interest. 26 In support of its conclusion the Court cited Ingraham v. 
15 /d. 
16 /d. at 119, 479 N.E.2d at 139. Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the 
violation of constitutional or federal statutory rights against any person acting under color 
of state law. 
17 395 Mass. at 119, 479 N .E.2d at 139-40. In addition to the district judge and court 
psychiatrist, the defendants included two court clerks, the hospital to which the plaintiff 
was committed, the Commissioner of Mental Health, and the Governor. The hospital was 
not a party to the motion to dismiss filed by the other defendants nor to the appeal. The 
Court affirmed the granting of the motion to dismiss as to the court clerks because they 
are absolutely immune from suit when acting at the judge's direction. /d. at 133,479 N.E.2d 
at 147. The Court also affirmed the dismissal as to the Governor and Commissioner of 
Mental Health in that there was no evidence connecting them with the events alleged by 
the plaintiff. Id. at 134, 479 N.E.2d at 148. 
18 395 Mass. at 126, 479 N.E.2d at 143. See G.L. c.I23, § 12. 
19 395 Mass. at 127, 479 N.E.2d at 144. See G.L. c.123, §§ 10(a) and 12(c). 
20 395 Mass. at 119 n.3, 479 N.E.2d at 139 n.3. 
21 /d. at I 19, 479 N.E.2d at 139. 
22 /d. 
23 /d. at 124, 479 N.E.2d at 139. 
24 /d. at 123, 479 N.E.2d at 142 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 542 (1981) 
(quoting Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1975), modified en bane, 545 
F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978)). 
25 /d. at 126, 479 N.E.2d at 143. 
26 430 u.s. 651, 682 ( 1977). 
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Wright, in which the Supreme Court held that a hearing after the infliction 
of corporal punishment upon high school students satisfied due process 
because post-deprivation remedies were adequate. 27 Therefore, the Su-
preme Judicial Court concluded that it is not the nature of the interest 
which determines whether a post-deprivation procedure is consistent 
with due process. Rather it is "whether the state was in a position to 
provide pre-deprivation process and whether it supplies adequate post-
deprivation process."28 Because the alleged acts of the judge and psy-
chiatrist were in violation of statutory procedures, the Court considered 
pre-deprivation process to have been impossible. 29 Therefore, the Court 
proceeded to examine the adequacy of post-deprivation remedies avail-
able to the plaintiff. 
The Court found that the appeals process or state habeas corpus were 
adequate mechanisms for the plaintiff to have questioned the legality of 
his commitment.3° Furthermore, the fact that they were no longer avail-
able did not mean that they were not adequate post-deprivation remedies 
satisfying due process. Although his confinement had ended, the Court 
suggested that a Rule 60(b) motion would still lie within the discretion of 
the trial court to relieve the plaintiff of the stigma of having been admitted 
involuntarily. 31 The more difficult question for the Court was whether a 
state damage action was an adequate remedy available to the plaintiff. 32 
The plaintiff argued that a state tort action for damages was not adequate 
if he was unable to recover because the officials were immune from 
liability under state law. The Court held that the adequacy issue is not 
contingent upon whether the plaintiff is entitled to an actual recovery of 
damages, but rather whether state law provides an opportunity for a 
hearing on the issue. 33 Thus, although the judge was immune from liability 
27 395 Mass. at 125, 479 N.E.2d at 143. 
28 /d. at 127-28, 479 N.E.2d at 144. 
29 /d. at 127, 479 N.E.2d at 144. 
30 /d. at 133, 479 N.E.2d at 147. Rule 60(b) provides the Court with broad discretion to 
relieve a party from a final judgment or order under appropriate circumstances. MAss. R. 
C1v. PRo. 60(b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974). See Parrell v. Keenan, 389 Mass. 809, 452 N.E.2d 
506, 512 (1983) (rule gives court power to vacate judgment "whenever such action is 
appropriate to accomplish justice") (quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601,615 
(1949)). 
31 395 Mass. at 126, 479 N.E.2d at 143. 
32 /d. at 128-29, 479 N.E.2d at 145. See Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 797 (4th Cir. 
1983) (due process satisfied by hearing before tribunal with power to grant remedy) aff'd 
on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986). 
33 395 Mass. at 129, 479 N .E.2d at 145. See Joyce v. Hickey, 337 Mass. 118, 121-22 
(absolute immunity for judges acting in exercise of jurisdiction vested by law). The Court 
suggested that the psychiatrist may be liable for damages if he violated the provisions of 
the commitment statute. 395 Mass. at 129, 479 N.E.2d at 145. See G.L. c.l23, § 22 
(immunity from damage suits if acting pursuant to the statute). 
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under the doctrine of judicial immunity, the state remedy was adequate 
and the Parratt test was satisfied. 34 The Court further noted that state 
law provided no greater immunity than was available under federal law. 
Having decided that the Parratt doctrine warranted a dismissal of the 
plaintiff's procedural due process claims, the Court considered two sub-
stantive constitutional claims raised by the plaintiff. 35 First, because the 
alleged conduct of the defendants was not so egregious as to "shock the 
conscience of the Court," the Court held that the alleged violations of 
the commitment statute did not rise to the level of a violation of sub-
stantive due process. 36 Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiff's fourth 
amendment claim because there were no facts to suggest that his appre-
hension was unlawful or that his temporary commitment was unreason-
ableY The Court therefore held that the dismissal of all federal claims 
against the defendants was proper. 
The Parratt doctrine was born of the concern that every tort claim 
against a person acting under color of state law would become a federal 
cause of action under 42 U .S.C. section 1983 for the violation of due 
process.38 Parratt and its progeny can be read to limit procedural due 
process claims to those in which established state procedures fail to 
provide adequate protection or, if state procedures are violated, where 
the state post-deprivation remedy is deemed inadequate. 39 The Supreme 
Judicial Court was correct in holding that the Parratt rationale applies to 
34 395 Mass. at 130-31, 479 N.E.2d at 146. The Parratt doctrine applies to alleged 
violations of procedural due process not to violations of substantive constitutional rights. 
See Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 796 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'd en bane, 748 F.2d 229 
(1984) (Parratt applies to negligent deprivation of liberty interest but not to violations of 
substantive constitutional rights), aff'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986) (negligence 
insufficient to support due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
35 395 Mass. at 130-31, 479 N.E.2d at 146. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-
173 (1952) (state criminal procedures which "shock the conscience" violate substantive 
protection of due process clause). 
36 /d. at 131, 479 N.E.2d at 146. The Court reasoned that the initial seizure of the plaintiff 
was proper because it was based upon a warrant. The ten-day commitment was not 
unreasonable in view of its purpose to prevent serious harm to the plaintiff or others. I d. 
37 395 Mass. at 132, 479 N.E.2d at 147. The Court also considered the plaintiff's claims 
under state law and found the judge absolutely immune from suit. See DeLoach v. Tracy, 
352 Mass. 135, 136, 223 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1967) (absolute immunity when judge is acting 
within his jurisdiction). The Court reversed the dismissal of the state claim against the 
psychiatrist under G.L. c.123, § 22 because the extent of his immunity under the statute 
involved factual determinations. 395 Mass. at 132, 479 N.E.2d at 147. The Court affirmed 
the dismissal of the claims against the other defendants. /d. at 133, 479 N .E.2d at 147-148. 
38 See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (expressing concern that broad reading of 
due process clause would make fourteenth amendment "a front of tort law to be superim-
posed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States"). 
39 See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1982) (Parratt does not 
apply when deprivation results from application of "established state procedure"). 
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a deprivation of liberty as well as property. There is no constitutional 
difference between liberty and property interests where state officials 
violate state procedures in a random and unauthorized manner.40 The 
important inquiry, as the Temple Court recognized, is not the nature of 
the interest but whether the pre-deprivation due process was impossible 
or impracticable.41 The Supreme Judicial Court held that because state 
officials allegedly ignored state procedures, pre-deprivation process was 
impossible.42 However, Professor Blum has suggested that not all viola-
tions of state procedure should warrant the application of the Parratt 
doctrine.43 Where those responsible for providing pre-deprivation pro-
tection have intentionally violated state procedures and the requirements 
of due process, the deprivation should not be viewed as random and 
unauthorized.44 Because the judge and the psychiatrist in Temple were 
responsible for providing due process protection in the commitment pro-
ceedings, the Court should have distinguished the case from Parratt.45 
In deciding whether the state remedy was adequate the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court focused on the opportunity to be heard rather than whether 
damages would be available in fact under state law.46 The fact that the 
recovery might be barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity under state 
law, the Temple Court concluded, did not make the state remedy inade-
quate.47 Although most lower courts have reached a similar conclusion, 
it has been argued that the state remedy is meaningless if it is not in fact 
available.48 However, the adequacy problem is not as serious where the 
40 This does not mean that the nature of the interest is irrelevant in deciding what process 
is "due." See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (private interest affected is 
part of procedural due process balancing test). But where the state could not have provided 
pre-deprivation process because the acts of state officials were random and unauthorized, 
the nature of the interest is not determinative. See Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental 
Health Services, 804 F.2d 1549, 1554-55 (1986) (no difference in relevant importance of 
rights guaranteed under due process clause). 
41 395 Mass. at 125, 479 N.E.2d at 143. 
42 /d. at 128, 479 N.E.2d at 144. 
43 Blum, "Applying the Parratt/Hudson Doctrine: Defining the Scope of the Logan Es-
tablished State Procedure Exception and Determining the Adequacy of State Post-Depri-
vation Remedies," l3 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 695 (1986) (hereinafter cited as Applying 
Parratt). 
44 See Blum, Applying Parratt, supra note 43 at 713. (criticizing Temple because defen-
dant judge and psychiatrist were responsible for providing due process in commitment 
proceedings.) 
4s Id. 
46 395 Mass. at 128, 479 N.E.2d at 145. 
47 Id. at 129, 479 N.E.2d at 145. 
48 See Rittenhouse v. Dekalb County, 764 F.2d 1451, 1457-59 (lith Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied,_ U.S._, 106 S. Ct. ll93, 89 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1986) (state immunity does not make 
state remedy inadequate under Parratt). But see Davidson v. Canon, _u.s. -• 106 S. Ct. 
668, 676, 88 L.Ed.2d 677, 689 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("conduct that is wrongful 
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federal claim would be foreclosed by a similar doctrine of immunity.49 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court indicated that the plaintiff would 
also be barred under federal law by the judicial immunity doctrine, that 
fact did not appear to be relevant to its determination of adequacy. 5° 
under § 1983 surely cannot be immunized by state law"). See generally, Note, "Parratt v. 
Taylor Revisited: Defining the Adequate Remedy Requirement," 65 B.U.L.REv. 607 (1985) 
(hereinafter referred to as Parratt Revisited) (arguing for strict adequacy requirement). 
49 Parratt Revisited, supra note 48, at 638. 
50 395 Mass. at 129, 479 N.E.2d at 145. 
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